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This paper considers some of the relationships between subjects, social institutions, media and ideas that characterize differences between the environments in which both comics and fine art are produced, used and become comprehensible. It outlines a specific theoretical framework encompassing these differences, describing the discursive co-dependency between forms of media, the uses to which they are put and the habits of thought and expectation engendered by these uses. The paper describes the institutional realization of relative capacities to influence, in the creation of value (both as social status and economic status), and asks if is it possible to consider the general structures that finally manifest in the specific differences between conceptions of artworks and comics.
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Crossing boundaries of language and culture, the international contemporary fine art market is a largely monolithic, cohesive social environment built upon the post- War, four-way participation of commercial fine art dealers, private collectors, trade journals and publicly maintained cultural institutions.​[1]​ It is into this environment that contemporary fine artists both inveigle themselves and deliver new works of art as raw material, if they are interested in acquiring status and making money in this particular marketplace. The practices that constitute this market transform these works, and to some extent an image of the artist, into branded status commodities that can be traded or laid up, in a continual process of validation and disavowal amongst the market’s four types of participants, that ultimately produces both historically inviolable commodities (or ‘masterpieces’) and the putative narrative of their creation (or contemporary art history).
The identification of this market as the semiotic engine generating the relative significance of fine art objects, encompassing and superseding an older paradigm of the adjudication of their value, which was based on the concept of the unique properties of these objects, largely derives from Danto’s attempts to theorize a hermeneutics of art in the mid 1960s.​[2]​ Danto claims that explanations of both the past and possible functions of art, broadly produced as contemporary art history, are only comprehensible given an expertise in art as a topic (or a profession), and that this expertise derives from a dynamic of consensus and attrition, or differences in expert opinion, which validates or disavows the different levels of shared expertise that this creates.
Danto’s idea of the hermeneutic power of consensus was extrapolated and placed on a comprehensive sociological footing by both Dickie and Becker although, as this paper will indicate, their general approaches to theorizing the relationship between value and types of consensus/attrition remains relatively shallow, in that they both approach Danto’s “artworld” somewhat as a special case, rather than placing it within a wider conception of the function of this relationship itself.​[3]​ However, in extrapolating Danto’s hermeneutic theory, Dickie arrives as the notion of the art world as an institution, or a self-correcting system in which the status of the artwork derives from the degree to which individual iterations either confirm of deny the functions of the institution. Further, Becker places this idea in the context of the wider creation of institutions socially, as a network of confirmatory or inimical relationships between iteration and consensus, writing:
Art worlds typically have intimate and extensive relations with the worlds from which they try to distinguish themselves. They share sources of supply with those other worlds, recruit personnel from them, adopt ideas that originate in them, and compete with them for audiences and financial support.​[4]​
More recently, Zolberg has pursues this idea in detail, analyzing the way in which cultural products are continually re-categorized according to changes in types of social consensus brought about by developments in technology, for example. She maps some of the ways in which the status of experiences of the products of the entertainments industry is changing relative to experiences of artworks validated by the international fine art market.​[5]​
Alternatively, the markets for comic strips are historically differentiated along language lines, into a handful of distinct production and consumption cultures that are still only peripherally integrated, with a couple of anomalous exceptions.​[6]​ A major absence of a history of translation of francophone works into the languages of other markets demarcates the existence of francophone brands (––that is, reader expectations), overriding potential market synergies between European cultures, for example. Alternatively, and quite distinctly, the consumption of translated manga in America in the last 10 years is a case study in the rapid creation of a market for more than a brand, rather an entire genre, as Casey Brienza points out.​[7]​ Although the practices of this new market have had an impact on the practices of older, as it were, ‘home’ markets, they have as yet not consolidated them. In English, Beaty provides a masterful analysis of the history and mechanisms of the Anglophone American market, again utterly distinct, in his 2012 Comics Versus Art.​[8]​
These differences, very lightly touched upon here, constitute definitions of each market according to differences in practices between them––that is, differences in the ways in which the contemporary fine art market and comics markets are imagined, historicized, produced, distributed, promoted and consumed; and differences in their formal trends relative to the histories and expectations of their readers and consumers.
As Dickie, Becker, Zolberg and subsequently Beaty discuss, it is the differences and similarities in practices of these social environments (the contemporary fine art market and the markets for comics), that are significant, rather than any formal differences between art objects and comics. Formal definitions of both comics and art are aspects of profound, systemic sets of conventions encompassing attitudes, histories and practices, beyond which they are flotsam––not meaningless, of course, but significantly set adrift.
On the basis of this description of the institutional realization of relative capacities to influence, in the creation of value (both as social status and economic status), is it possible to consider the general structures that finally manifest in the specific differences between conceptions of artworks and comics? To do this, I must identify and characterize a relationship between phenomena and ideas.
A description of a simple situation can exemplify this relationship. For example, if I stand in front of a building, I see the building, but I do not also see inside it or around it. However, I believe that it has both an interior and other sides. In fact, I perceive it as having the properties of ‘an interior’ and ‘other sides.’ Perceiving a building and also perceiving aspects of the building that are not immanent, in which I adjudicate perception in a relationship between perception and belief about what I have perceived. Not only is there a distinction between my perception and the object of my perception, there is also a distinction between my perception and my understanding of what I perceive. There is the building (the object of perception) about which this understanding constitutes a belief.
As I perceive the building, I do not perceive the interior of the building or the sides of the building that I cannot see. I perceive the building and perceive myself imagining the properties of ‘an interior’ and ‘other sides.’ The object of perception requires consciousness of a perceiving subject in order for it to be perceived. Consequently, a constituent of my perception of the building is a type of belief about it, and this belief is phenomenal, or perceived.
This model then locates the subject as a structural aspect of a process of imagining aspects of the phenomenal world. This imagining introduces belief to an explanation of perception and phenomena, the role of which is to modulate, revise and reconstitute perception according to the creation of a subject. This constitutes intersubjective, social and cultural knowledge.
To continue the example, my belief in those properties of the building that I cannot perceive also involves a functional ascription of value, both in Broad’s sense of ‘obligation,’ or ‘deontology, ‘ but also in the widest sense of adjudications of preference, approbation and disapprobation relative to what is both perceived and imagined.​[9]​ There is no neutral-value ontology in a structure of relative point of view. Hence, imagining ascribes value. This is the axiomatic characteristic of the perceived belief in the existence of unperceived properties, relative to perception: in including itself as an object of perception, my point of view ascribes value.
How are these values adjudicated? In perceiving a building and believing that it has properties that I don’t perceive, I imagine myself in my relationship with the building. The value that I ascribe to this imagined relationship, including my part in it, can be described according to the degree of promotion of, or resistance to, this imagined relationship. My imagined beliefs about my relationship with the building are categorical and propositional. They are representations of the subject made by adjudicating the value of the imagined relationship between the building and the subject. Hence, the subject describes either the coadunatory or inimical interrelation between systems of beliefs, ideas or ascribed meanings, and phenomenal and social experiences of the world, which these systems either affirm or belie. It realizes the promotion or resistance of different types of imagining on the basis that they either reproduce or contradict a dominant structure of belief.
These structures of belief are phenomenal and affective, because they are representations that are produced and perceived. This is what Vološinov means when he insists that the structures of ideas that are realized in representations cannot be described except according to “the material basis” of the representation itself, even if this representation is cognitive and interoceptive.​[10]​ Further, this “material basis” can be nothing other than institutional––it is instantially produced relative to nominal behavior–– and therefore productive of degrees of resistance and compliance, creating society, as Destutt de Tracy proposed.​[11]​ 
The structures of beliefs are derived from the semiotic instantiation in present-time of the general potential resources of the body. As with the realization of representations of emotional sensations, structures of belief do not represent themselves. Rather they are only perceptible in realizations of their coadunatory or inimical functions in representations. In this sense, representations are simply actions and the products of actions. My behaving in a particular way and not in another realizes the system of ideas that structure my actions, in making changes to the ecology of the body.
On this basis, it is possible to describe the way in which imagining itself is inhibited and facilitated. Imagining is inhibited and facilitated by degrees of resistance to or promotion of those values ascribed to unperceived properties in which there is a belief, where imagining is instantial relative to an institutional norm.​[12]​
Then the question remains as to the function by which resistance or promotion of one type of imagining or another occur. How is the nominal aspect of an institutional structure realised? What makes the nominal? Simply, the nominal is believed to be what is true, and what is true is determined by the subject’s capacity to influence, that is, to make representations that are believed to be true. Hence, where nominal structure and individual iteration fully coincide, then what can be imagined can both be imagined and can be imagined to be true, and where they least coincide, either nothing can be imagined (imagination fails), or what is imagined is false.
The capacity to imagine oneself perceiving then allows ‘misrecognition,’ or an internalised submission to the status of the object of perception, including self-perception, that also insists on its own truth. This hegemonic function, within which the subject continually struggles and by which it is subsumed, inculcates an imaginative as well as cognitive consensus, characterized by solipsism, identifying particular situations and behaviour as pan-historic, a-temporal and pan-social. Concepts such as ‘true, ’ ‘woman’ or ‘nature’ fall into this category, for example. As a result, different propositions about the world insist on their truth in opposition to others as a prerequisite of struggle itself, so that both ideas and imagining become instruments in social struggles between different types of misrecognition. It is not only a matter of the relative absence or presence of perceived and expected cues that inhibit imagining, but also of the similarity in the stance that the subject adopts towards perception in self-perceiving.
In bringing this exemplary explanation to a close, I must not omit bodily practices and every type of social manifestation and institution from the explanation. The promotion or resistance to ideas constitutes the capacity to imagine within conventions of inhibition and facilitation. Thus the constitutive generation of the subject, as a function of imagination, occurs in a dynamic relationship with the production of material practices through habituation, not only through cognition or acts of imagination, but though the perpetuation and reproduction of types of actions and responses, even at the most micro level, and certainly in producing and understanding representations.
Having identified and characterized a relationship between phenomena and ideas, I am able consider some of the relationships between subjects, social institutions, media and ideas that characterize differences between the social environments in which both comics are fine artworks are produced, used and made comprehensible. A specific theoretical framework can encompass these differences, describing the discursive co-dependency between forms of media, the uses to which they are put and the habits of thought and expectation engendered by these uses. This theoretical frame describes these relationships as ideology, deriving in general from Karl Mannheim’s and from Marx and Engels’ critiques of ideocracy, the promotion of or resistance to ideas on the grounds of the degree to which they reproduce or contradict a dominant social structure.​[13]​ Theorized this way, ideology is not a set of ideas, but rather the consolidatory or antagonistic relationship between sets of ideas and people’s different experiences of the world, which these ideas might or might not contradict. 
Struggle, resistance and compliance are then as important in mapping the possibilities and limitations of imagining as they are in theorizing the emergence of institutional structures and, in particular, in discussing a significant manifestation of his struggle: the adoption of the practices and beliefs, as instantiations, relative to the nominal aspects of institutions, for whom the adoption constitutes subjective compliance, termed cultural hegemony. Hegemony, in this sense, is an operation in the field of a struggle to imagine, in which adopted meanings embody the perceived world and all of its changing possibilities and impossibilities.
Hence, the relationships between the dominant ideas of one group of people and the world experiences of other groups include misrecognition as a systemic function. Those ideas that dominate social discourse in any particular circumstance are not actively misrepresented by the dominant order, according to this model, but rather misrecognised by others for whom their functions are invisible and for whom they are socially and materially disadvantageous.
Here, a process of misrecognition is important because it adds complexity to the foundational idea in this model: that embodied social discourse in the form of practices and institutions generates systems of ideas rather than the reverse. In cultural hegemonic relationships, however, imagined relationships motivate practices, apparently counter-intuitively.
One of the functions of this misrecognition is an imaginative projection of timelessness upon hegemonic ideas. As a result, the function of cultural hegemony is to inculcate a cognitive consensus identifying particular ideas not with the interests or behavior of one social group or other, but with a pan-historic, a-temporal and pan-social concept such as ‘nature’, ‘human’ or ‘quality’ for example
Building on this, I can argue that the promotion or resistance to ideas occurs alongside an hegemonic inculcation of material practices through habituation, not only through cognition or acts of imagination, but though the perpetuation and reproduction of types of actions and responses, even at the most micro level, such as gestures. Different groups of people utilize different types of expression from each other and utilize their bodies differently. As a result, these practices literally embody comprehensions of social differences and take a part, alongside the imaginative projection of ideas, in hegemonic relationships, the reproduction of social structures and the broader struggles to influence.
In these terms, ideology is dynamic. As Giddens identifies “logonomic systems are by no means irresistible: on the contrary, the extent to which they hold sway or break down ( … ) is itself (a) symptom of the state of society,” so that levels of equilibrium between the capacity to influence, on one hand, and the effect of dominant convention on the other hand, articulate mutually antithetical affects and sustain dynamic contradictions, producing both social structures and individual agency.​[14]​
Given this theoretical lens, in which practices and ideas are both codependent and systemically obscured, consider the productions of a number of artists whose status within the marketplaces of comics and fine art is either: a) transitional from comics markets to the fine art market (such as Gary Panter), or b) instrumentally utilizes generic ideas of one set of market practices in, say Anglophone comics, held by the participants in another market, such as the contemporary fine art market (such as Janette Parris and Raymond Pettibon) or c) applies established methods from one market to encompass and objectify the practices of another (such as Lichtenstein, following, say Manet).
Considering an example of transition from the comics market to the fine art market, the vocal and perspicatious Panter is both familiar with and inured to the social mechanics of the fine art market, which he patently understands as a result of status–driven and finance–driven, often frustrated, attempts to transform his material and himself, by changing his market. Panter sees no reason for his comics to be less valuable than fine artwork, apart from his relative lack of success in the fine art market or, rather, his inability to participate fully in the core practices that make the market. He is right. There is no reason for the disparity in value, apart from the performance of the work in two different markets.​[15]​
Janette Parris, on the other hand, is a historic participant in the fine art market, self-positioning through the Goldsmith’s College Masters Program in London in 1994, an established market gateway at the time. Parris made aspects of the fine art market’s generic, that is, generalized, notion of comics part of her promotional ‘brand.’ Joining a contemporaneous art market fashion for public participation, and coinciding with the early Anglophone rise of autobiographical and confessional comics, comics offered one formal response to the opportunity for presenting People’s History as a fine art commodity.
Similarly, although with quite different raw materials, Raymond Pettibon also commodifies aspects of perceived comics culture for the fine art market. Pettibon’s work both matches and objectifies the list of characteristics of practice of Anglophone American comics discussed by Beaty: appeals to folk nationalism; the appearance of a dynamic of exclusion and inclusion which turns on an axis of arcane knowledge or expertise, coupled with the projection of marginalization; ‘outsiderness’ or a sense of social disenfranchisement; a lack of academic training in culture; visionary psychology and a sense of exclusive belonging, in opposition to a cultural mainstream. Of course, Pettibon’s artworks are not authorless in the sense that Beaty describes American comics as historically seeming authorless. Rather, aided by his high profile as a punk scenester, Pettibon transforms these characteristics into the unique attributes of a single author––himself––one of the prerequisite of art market practices.​[16]​
The development of the status of the artworks of both Parris and Pettibon, with specific different degrees of success, are antithetical to Panter. Whilst Panter seeks to create parity between the different degrees of status of comics and artworks, by appealing to their putative formal properties, rather Parris and Pettibon strategically index the lower status of their products as part of the creation and maintenance of a commoditized idea of authenticity: they have attained sufficient capacity to influence, in the milieu of the fine art market, to enable them to trade upon exactly those properties in their products which Panter seeks to diminish. They utilize generic ideas of one set of market practices in order to influence the participants in another.
Roy Lichtenstein, on the other hand, although still often discussed as an ‘appropriator’ of comics’ forms, was, perhaps paradoxically, a conservative painter repeating the historically tested social formulae of other successful contemporary painters. This historically tested method constitutes the application of established methods from one market to encompass and objectify the practices of another. In a reading that is antithetical to much of the analysis of Lichtenstein’s iconography, it is possible to claim that he did not employ the formal devices of comics at all. Rather, he made paintings that depicted comics, in the way that Fantin-Latour had made paintings that depicted vases of flowers or Millais had made a painting that depicted Ophelia. In this, Lichtenstein follows Manet, whose depictions of depictions form a minor but important part of a project to enumerate the experiences of the contemporary life of the 1870s. For Lichtenstein, comics imagery provided a painting challenge––that is, how to make paintings depicting contemporary American life in the 1950s and 1960s. However, for the fine art market of the period, paintings depicting comics provided essential new news.​[17]​
Considering these examples in ideological terms, the social antagonism between different propositions about the world requires that competing propositions insist on the truth of their particular vision, in opposition to others, as a foundation of struggle itself, rather than producing any understanding that contingency is the single condition by which hegemony is undermined.
By insisting on this truth, both comics and works of art become objects without a subject, which are theoretically disembodied, in which specific tropes are identified with hierarchically arranged meanings, emerging with pan-subjective, pan-cultural consistency across all human times and places. They become fixed tools used in social struggles between different types of misrecognition.
It is not surprising, then, that here is still contemporary currency in both misrecognition and the perpetuation of objectification, in some traditions within the academic discipline of art history, for example, particularly if we recall that art history is always a putative origin story. Art historian Claire Bishop exemplifies misrecognition when she writes in her 2012 Artificial Hells: participatory art and the politics of spectatorship "art is given to be seen by others."​[18]​ This description demarcates the way in which the experience of a work of art is placed theoretically beyond the discourse of the work (including the practices that constitute a market) in any way other than as a distinct situation in which, alone, a scopophillic view can be taken. In effect, this theoretical delimitation of the experience of an audience is an art-historical definition of the work of art itself, or an approach to cultural experience that misrecognises and effaces social relationships by objectifying and instrumentalizing them.
But, as Hodge and Kress remind us, the social equilibrium achieved through this type of objectification constitutes exactly a misrecognition of those social praxes that produce the situation itself, because “’truth’ and ‘reality’ ( … ) mark agreement over or challenges to the temporary state of the semiotic system”, so that “‘Truth’ is therefore a description of the state when social participants ( … ) accept the system of classification.”​[19]​
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